- Williams and Cusk on Technologies of the Self
The rejection of a "characterless" moral self is central to some of Bernard Williams' most important contributions to philosophy. By the time of Truth and Truthfulness, he works instead with a model of the self constituted and stabilized out of more primitive materials through deliberation and in concert with others that takes inspiration from Diderot. Although this view of the self raises some difficult questions, it serves as a useful starting point for thinking about the process of developing an authentic moral point of view in the context of contemporary living. In what follows, I begin to fill out and extend this picture of the self and its related notion of authenticity by exploring some of the "technologies of the self" at play in Rachel Cusk's recent work (primarily, the Outline trilogy, Coventry, Second Place, and "The Stuntman") that ask us to rethink the possibility and importance of stability; seek a way of constituting oneself and one's values outside the confining structures of traditional narrative (focusing instead on a framework that might be provided by the visual arts); and give a different role to the sort of internalized other Williams sees as being at work in the mechanisms of shame.
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- On Certainty, Change, and "Mathematical Hinges"
Annalisa Coliva (2020) asks, "Are there mathematical hinges?" I argue, against Coliva's own conclusion, that there are. I further claim that this affirmative answer allows a case to be made for taking the concept of a hinge to be a useful and general-purpose tool for studying mathematical practice in its real complexity. Seeing how Wittgenstein can, and why he would, countenance mathematical hinges additionally gives us a deeper understanding of some of his latest thoughts on mathematics. For example, a view of how mathematical hinges relate to Wittgenstein's well-known river-bed analogy enables us to see how his way of thinking about mathematics can account nicely for a "dynamics of change" within mathematical research—something his philosophy of mathematics has been accused of missing (e.g., by Robert Ackermann (1988) and Mark Wilson (2006)). Finally, the perspective on mathematical hinges ultimately arrived at will be seen to provide us with illuminating examples of how our conceptual choices and theories can be ungrounded but nevertheless the right ones (in a sense to be explained).
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- Indeterminacy, Coincidence, and "Sourcing Newness" in Mathematical Research
Far from being unwelcome or impossible in a mathematical setting, indeterminacy in various forms can be seen as playing an important role in driving mathematical research forward by providing "sources of newness" in the sense of Hutter and Farías ("Sourcing Newness: Ways of Inducing Indeterminacy," 2017). I argue here that mathematical coincidences, phenomena recently under discussion in the philosophy of mathematics, are usefully seen as inducers of indeterminacy and as put to work in guiding research directions. I suggest that to call a pair of mathematical facts (merely) a coincidence is roughly to suggest that the investigation of connections between these facts isn't worthwhile. To say of this pair, "That's no coincidence!" is to suggest just the opposite. I further argue that this perspective on mathematical coincidence, which pays special attention to what mathematical coincidences do, may provide us with a better view of what mathematical coincidences are than extant accounts. I close by reflecting on how understanding mathematical coincidences as generating indeterminacy accords with a conception of mathematical research as ultimately aiming to reduce indeterminacy and complexity to triviality as proposed by Gian-Carlo Rota in "The Pernicious Influence of Mathematics Upon Philosophy" (1997).
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- Prolegomena to Virtue-Theoretic Studies in the Philosophy of Mathematics
This paper argues that additional theorizing about mathematical practice is needed to properly ground appeals to the virtues in mathematics. It further aims to contribute to this theorizing, first, by characterizing mathematical practice as being epistemic and "objectual" in the sense of Knorr Cetina ("Objectual Practices," 2001). Then, it elaborates a MacIntyrean framework for extracting conceptions of the virtues related to mathematical practice so understood. Finally, it makes the case that Wittgenstein's methodology for examining mathematics and its practice is the most appropriate one to use for the actual investigation of mathematical practice within this MacIntyrean framework. At each stage of thinking through mathematical practice by these means, places where new virtue-theoretic questions are opened up for investigation are noted and briefly explored.
[ official / preprint ]